Farbwerke Hoechst AG v Unichem Laboratories (1968)
High Court of Bombay·11 July 1968
Latest update: . Case: Hanmi Pharm Co Ltd v Controller General of Patents and Designs. Doctrine: Amendment Before the Controller.
Does delay in suing bar a perpetual injunction for patent infringement at trial?
Mere delay is no bar to a perpetual injunction at the hearing of the suit, unless there is something more than mere delay which has caused prejudice to the defendants.
Doctrine last updated on 17 November 2026
Acquiescence, Laches and Estoppel, Ali on Patents, www.aop.onl/acquiescence-and-laches
1Res judicata is treated as a part of the principle of estoppel. (See Mulla’s Code of Civil Procedure, seventeenth edn, 2007, vol 1, p 193 onwards.) The doctrine of res judicata contained in s 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 corresponds to the English doctrine of estoppel by judgment and the same applies to patent infringement suits as well. The question of the validity of the patent which is raised as a defence in an infringement suit was res judicata between the parties to the suit, if the issue of validity was decided earlier between the parties. Thus, judgment in an earlier action on the validity of a patent estopped the defendant from denying the validity of the patent in a subsequent action. (See Shoe Machinery Co v Cultan [1896] 1 Ch 667, p 669.) But the defendant will be allowed to question the validity of the patent on fresh grounds not raised in the earlier proceedings. (See Chiron Corpn v Organon Teknika Ltd (No 6) [1994] FSR 448, p 454.) A person who unsuccessfully opposes a patent under s 25 shall not be estopped from filing a petition for revocation under s 64. (Surajmal Rambux v Laxminaryan Raghunath (1951) AIR 1951 Nag 284, a case decided under the Patents and Designs Act 1911 which compared the opposition proceedings under s 9 with the revocation proceedings under s 26, and concluded that an unsuccessful opponent could bring an action for revocation, on account of the difference in grounds, and the different stages in which they were preferred.)
2Order 2, r 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 requires the plaintiff to include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. (See Mulla’s Code of Civil Procedure, seventeenth edn, 2007, vol 2, p 124 onwards.) The plaintiff may also relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any court. If the plaintiff omits to sue or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim, he shall be estopped from suing in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished, except where he has procured the leave of the court to sue at a future point in time. Order 2, r 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 protects the defendant from being vexed twice for the same cause of action. (Ibid, vol 1, p 195.)
3Order 2, r 2 prohibits a plaintiff from raising a matter in a subsequent suit which he ought to have raised in the earlier proceeding. However, O 2, r 2 does not bar a defence in respect of the same cause of action. (Mohd Khatil Khan v Mahboob Ali Mian AIR 1949 PC 78. See also Nav Samaj Ltd, Nagpur v Shom Rao AIR 1984 Bom 23.)
4In Farbwerke Hoechst v Unichem Laboratories (1968) the Bombay High Court held that “mere delay is no bar to the granting of relief by way of perpetual injunction at the hearing of the suit, unless there is something more than mere delay which has caused prejudice to the defendants” (p 58).
5In Garware Wall Ropes v A.I. Chopra (2008) the Bombay High Court held that “It is noteworthy that the infringement is still continuing and therefore, I think that the cause of action is continuing and there is neither any delay nor latches on the part of the appellant/plaintiff.” (para 25)
6In Ravi Kamal Bali v Kala Tech (2008) the Bombay High Court held, at the interlocutory stage, that “I would not deny the Plaintiffs the reliefs which I find he is otherwise entitled to on merits if I am satisfied that there were no mala-fides on his part regarding the manner in which he made the application on 2.12.2005. Mere delay of the nature in the present case would not disentitle the Plaintiff to reliefs atleast at the hearing of the Notice of Motion. If however the delay was with a view to snatching an order from this Court without notice to the Defendants in a dishonest manner, the Notice of Motion ought to be dismissed.” (para 43) Of the defendants’ sales it held that “Considering the nature of the product, I would consider the sales to be substantially enough for a competitor to be aware of the same” (para 49), and that “It is difficult to believe in the facts and circumstances of this case that he remained unaware of the Defendants commercial activities thereafter for fifteen months” (para 54). It held that “I do not suggest for a moment that mere delay would itself disentitle the Plaintiff to the injunction” (para 58).
7In Telemecanique & Controls (I) v Schneider Electric Industries (2001) a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, on a plea of acquiescence and estoppel founded on minutes of a meeting of the two former joint-venture partners, held that “It clearly emerges from the minutes that despite the insistence of the appellant that the D2 range was nothing but an improvement or modification of the D1 range, the respondent was not willing to accept the same.”, and of the respondent’s having wished the appellant good luck, that “Can such wishing of good luck be construed as a license to copy? In our considered view the answer to this question can only be no.” (para 21) It held that “We are afraid that we are unable to read anything in the minutes which can entitle the appellant to copy the D2 range of the respondent. Thus the pleas of estoppel, acquiescence cannot be sustained.” (para 22) The party raising the plea had itself not moved: “the failure of the appellant to claim its rights under the technical services agreement and initiating proceedings does give rise to a prima facie view that the appellant did not agitate its rights in respect of the D2 range”, and “further if a party is not willing or is negligent in invoking its legal rights, the necessary consequences must follow.” (para 17) On the plea of delay and laches coupled with it, the Single Judge’s conclusion “that there was no material delay as to disentitle the respondent to any relief on that account” was upheld, the Bench seeing “no reason to interfere with this finding of the learned Single Judge arrived at on the basis of the appreciation of the factual position and keeping in mind the fact that the respondent is registered owner of the patents and designs” (para 25).
8In Midas Hygiene Industries v Sudhir Bhatia (2004) the Supreme Court, in a case of trade mark and copyright, held that “The law on the subject is well settled. In cases of infringement either of Trade Mark or of Copyright normally an injunction must follow. Mere delay in bringing action is not sufficient to defeat grant of injunction in such cases. The grant of injunction also becomes necessary if it prima facie appears that the adoption of the Mark was itself dishonest.” (para 5) It held that “In our view on the facts extracted by the learned Single Judge this was a fit case where an interim injunction should have been granted and should have been continued. In our view the Division Bench was entirely wrong in vacating that injunction merely on the ground of delay and laches.” (para 7).
9In Conqueror Innovations v Xiaomi Technology India (2026) a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, upholding the refusal of an interim injunction in a patent suit, held that “Form-27 for April 2015, filed by Appellant No. 2 before the patent office, demonstrates that the patentee was, at the relevant time, aware of mobile manufacturers employing technologies which, according to the Appellants, infringed the suit patent.”, and that “Despite such knowledge, the Appellants did not approach the Court in 2015 or within any reasonable period thereafter but chose to institute the present proceedings only after a period of approximately nine (9) years. Such prolonged and conscious delay by the plaintiff evidences lack of urgency and is, by itself, a sufficient ground to not grant an interim injunction, and such a plaintiff should be directed to proceed with trial to prove infringement and claim damages.” It held that “In these circumstances, the learned Single Judge was justified in declining interim relief on the sole ground of delay itself.” (para 46)
High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench·18 December 2008
High Court of Delhi·7 November 2001
High Court of Delhi·7 September 2026
Doctrine page · Written by Prof. Feroz Ali
www.aop.onl/acquiescence-and-laches