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Girdhari Lal Gupta v K. Gian Chand Jain & Co (1977)

High Court of Delhi·V.S. Deshpande, H.L. Anand & Chadha JJ·Full Bench·Decided 22 December 1977·AIR 1978 Del 146

Good law Appeals allowed: the order refusing amendment of the written statements set aside, the amendment allowed, and the jurisdiction question decided by the Full Bench itself, the cancellation applications to proceed before the single Judge. Followed by a Division Bench in 1983 and carried into patent revocation practice by the Delhi High Court in 2022. Interlocutory

A design cancellation petition lies only in the High Court of the place of registration or of the place where the registered design injures the applicant's trade.

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Girdhari Lal Gupta v K. Gian Chand Jain & Co, Ali on Patents, www.aop.onl/girdhari-lal

Judgment PDF

Summary

“These two appeals against the order of a learned single Judge holding that the High Court of Delhi has jurisdiction to entertain the applications made by the respondents under S. 51-A of the Designs Act, 1911 (as amended)” “have been referred to the Full Bench for a fuller consideration of this important question of jurisdiction” (para 1). The respondents pleaded that “Both the respondents and the appellant are carrying on the same trade at Delhi”, that “The appellant has got two designs 131357 and 131364 registered in the Register of Designs maintained under Section 46 of the Act”, that “These designs had, however, been published in India in respect of laces prior to the date of registration secured by the appellant” and that “The trade of the respondents in Delhi is hampered by the trade of the appellant in the same goods, viz. laces, because of the wrongful protection afforded to the appellant by the registration.” (para 2) The appellant sought to amend his written statement to plead “that the jurisdiction for granting such a relief is only in the High Court at Calcutta” (para 3); “The learned single Judge refused to allow the amendment of written statements prayed for by the appellant on the ground that the amendment would be useless and had no merit” and held “that an application under S. 51-A for cancellation of the registration of a design can be filed in any High Court in India” (para 4).

The Full Bench held that “It is the power of a court over a territory and a subject-matter” (para 7) and that “the registration gives the registered proprietor of the design a monopoly of the copyright in the design and this extends to all the territories of India to which the Act applies. The impact of the registration, therefore, travels beyond the place of registration. This is the dynamic aspect of the effect of registration.” (paras 10–11) It concluded that “An application may, therefore, be filed either in the High Court having jurisdiction over the place at which the design is registered or in the High Court having jurisdiction over the place at which enjoyment of the copyright by the registered proprietor causes injury to the commercial interests of the applicant”, and that “the application cannot be made in any other High Court merely because the applicant chooses to do so.” (para 21) “We, therefore, set aside the order appealed against. We allow the amendment applied for by the appellant in the written statements filed by him in opposition to the applications made by the respondents under S. 51-A.” “The appeal is allowed in the above terms with no order as to costs.” (para 23)

What the court decided

  1. What jurisdiction is. “What is jurisdiction? It is the power of a court over a territory and a subject-matter. Power over a territory in itself is not sufficient. The territory is significant only as being the place at which the subject-matter is situated. If the subject-matter is outside the territory, the court would not have jurisdiction over it for the simple reason that the subject-matter would fall within the territorial jurisdiction of some other court.” (para 7)
  2. The nexus inquiry. “Where more than one authorities or courts are invited to exercise jurisdiction, it is relevant to inquire as to which of them has the real connection with subject-matter over which the jurisdiction is to be exercised. This inquiry will result in giving jurisdiction to the court having the nexus with the subject-matter and correspondingly in showing that the other courts which do not have a similar connection with the subject-matter would not have jurisdiction over it.” (para 8)
  3. The definition of High Court. “Though, there was only one Patent & Designs Office in India from 1911 to 1970, the definition of ‘High Court’ was never confined to one particular High Court.” “The reason why the legislature did not do so must be that according to the scheme of the Act, the legislature did not intend to confine jurisdiction for the revocation of patents and cancellation of registration of designs to the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over the Patent Office.” (para 7)
  4. Not the applicant’s choice of forum. “Such a view would almost mean that it is for the petitioner to choose any of the High Courts from the above list to file a petition under S. 51-A of the Act.” “This view would be opposed not only to the scheme of the Act, but also to our basic notion of the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court or any court.” “It could not be the intention of the legislature to arm the petitioner under S. 51-A with powers to harass the respondent.” (para 7)
  5. Static and dynamic effect. The Bench held that the contention that “the subject-matter consists only of the registration and the continuance of the registration of a design” “takes into account only the static effect of the registration. But the registration gives the registered proprietor of the design a monopoly of the copyright in the design and this extends to all the territories of India to which the Act applies. The impact of the registration, therefore, travels beyond the place of registration. This is the dynamic aspect of the effect of registration.” (paras 10–11)
  6. The two elements of Section 51-A. “An analysis of S. 51-A yields two distinct elements. The first element is the registration of the design and the effects of the registration-static and dynamic. The second is the capacity to make the application being vested only in a person interested. It is only when both these elements co-exist that an application under S. 51-A can be made for the cancellation of the registration on all or any of the grounds specified therein.” (para 11)
  7. Two kinds of legal injury. Of a person who “may intend to use the registered design but is prevented from carrying out his intention into practice”, “The cause of action in favor of such a person consists only of the existence of the registration. Since such a cause of action arises only at the place of the registration, it is only that High Court which has jurisdiction over the place of registration which can entertain an application under Section 51-A for the cancellation of the design from such a person.” (para 12) Of persons “who are actually using the said registered design”, “The legal injury to such traders is caused at the place at which their trade is carried on.” (paras 12–13)
  8. Person interested. “In other words, a person interested is a person aggrieved by the existing situation or by the cause of action.” (para 14) “The significance of being ‘person interested’ is, therefore, twofold. Firstly, it gives them the locus standi to make the application under Section 51-A. Secondly, it helps to fix the place at which the applications may be made by them, the place being Delhi where the injury to their interest occurred.” (paras 14–15)
  9. Section 51-A and Section 53 compared. “In our view, S. 51-A is the reverse of S. 53. While S. 53 enables the registered proprietor to obtain damages from a person, who violates copyright granted to him by the registration of the design, S. 51-A enables a person to attack the very correctness of the registration and to get it cancelled.” “If the situs of the damage under Section 53 can be the place where the damage is actually caused, there is no reason why the situs of the damage under Section 51-A should not be a relevant consideration to determine jurisdiction under S. 51-A.” (para 18)
  10. The scheme of the Act. Of the repealed sections, “All these provisions show that suits and applications are made to different High Courts in the local jurisdiction of which the cause of action arises or the subject is situated, The legislature contemplated that these High Courts could be different from the High Court having jurisdiction over the Controller.” “These provisions show that the jurisdiction of a High Court under the Act is determined by the nexus of the cause of action and/or the subject matter with the territory over which the High Court has jurisdiction.” (para 19)
  11. The definite article. “It is in this context that the use of the definite article ’the’ to qualify the court or the High Court in these provisions assumes significance. It is not a High Court or any High Court, but only the High Court which would have jurisdiction meaning that it is the nexus of the subject-matter or the cause of action with the territory of a High Court which fixes jurisdiction and vests it in that particular High Court.” (para 20)
  12. Where a cancellation petition lies. “An application may, therefore, be filed either in the High Court having jurisdiction over the place at which the design is registered or in the High Court having jurisdiction over the place at which enjoyment of the copyright by the registered proprietor causes injury to the commercial interests of the applicant.” “It follows, therefore, that the application cannot be made in any other High Court merely because the applicant chooses to do so. The applicant would have to show jurisdiction in the High Court to which the application is made”. “While such an application can always be made to the High Court within the local limits of which the registration of the design is made, the jurisdiction is not confined to that High Court, but would extend to any other High Court within the local limits of which a part of the cause of action and/or subject-matter of the application may arise.” (para 21)
  13. Departure from the earlier view. “This view differs from the view of the learned single Judge and the other decisions of this court relied in the order under appeal. We also differ from the view expressed by K. T. Desai J. of the High Court of Bombay in the Kohinoor Mills Co.’s Case” (para 21)
  14. Jurisdiction on these facts. “the respondents in the appeals before us are traders doing business at Delhi. They allege that their trading is injured because of the wrongful protection and monopoly given to the designs registered in favor of the appellant. This injury to the interest of the respondents takes place at Delhi.” (para 15) “A part of the cause of action or the subject-matter is, therefore, situated in Delhi. The application under S. 51-A can, therefore, be made at Delhi or at Calcutta, but in no other High Court.” (paras 15–16)
  15. Procedure. Leave to amend and disposition. “The application for amendment made by the appellant was, in our view rejected by the learned single Judge for insufficient reasons, namely, that the amendment would be useless and had no merit.” “We, therefore, set aside the order appealed against. We allow the amendment applied for by the appellant in the written statements filed by him in opposition to the applications made by the respondents under S. 51-A.” “At their request we have dealt with the question ourselves and have come to a conclusion different from the one arrived at by the learned single Judge.” “The appeal is allowed in the above terms with no order as to costs.” (para 23)
  16. The separate opinion of Anand J. Anand J, “while I respectfully concur in the conclusion that the single Judge should have granted leave to the appellant to amend the written statement, and in the further conclusion that in any event, this Court had ample jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the respondents”, recorded “my inability to subscribe to the view expressed by Deshpande, J. as to the principles of jurisdiction of the High Court in proceeding under S. 51-A of the Designs Act”, holding that “every High Court in India would have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the cancellation of registration of a design under S. 51-A of the Act by virtue merely of the dynamic effect throughout the territory of India of the registration of a design obviating the necessity of any further action or inaction or any other nexus between the territory and the subject-matter” (para 25), since “the dynamic effect of the static entry in the register provides sufficient nexus” (para 29). Chadha J “concur” “in the reasoning and conclusion of the proposed judgment of my learned brother Deshpande, J.” (paras 25, 29, 31)

What the court did not decide

“Fortunately in the present case, we are not concerned with the question whether standing includes merely capacity to sue or whether it includes a legal right or a part of the legal right to sue.” (para 16) “We have not considered the question whether the High Court acting under S. 51-A being a court of civil jurisdiction, the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable to the proceedings before it.” “Consequently, we have not considered whether the jurisdiction of the High Court would depend on the presence of the defendant or non-applicant within the local jurisdiction, that is to say, the residence of or carrying on of business by the defendant within the local jurisdiction of the High Court on the analogy of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (paras 16, 22)

Subsequent treatment

  • Followed — In Ajay Industrial v Shiro Kanao (1983) the Delhi High Court held that “On the ratio of the Full Bench, the application could be filed in the Calcutta High Court or any other High Court within whose jurisdiction the commercial interests of the applicant are affected by the enjoyment of the copyright by the registered proprietor.” (p 3)
  • Explained — In Dr Reddy’s Laboratories v Controller of Patents (2022) the Delhi High Court held that “since the dynamic effect of the patent, as contemplated in Girdhari Lal Gupta (supra), would also extend to other places where the commercial interest of the person interested may be affected, such other High Courts would also have jurisdiction to entertain revocation petitions, under section 64 of the Act” (para 82), but that “the dictum of Girdhari Lal Gupta(supra) cannot be applied to appellate proceedings.” (para 97)

Provisions and topics

Provisions
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Case page · Page updated 14 November 2026

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